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Everyone travelling through the People's Republic of China nowadays and 
comparing the situation with that of 1976, becomes well aware of the great 
changes that have been taking place since then. In the countryside, the pea- 
sants are building new houses, often two-storied and in the urban areas, one 
sees people dressed after the latest Western fashions. 
Statistical Evidence of Change 
The impressionistic perception is supported by the official statistics the Chi- 
nese are publishing to an ever increasing extent since about 1979. In Tables 1 to 
3, the author compares the fourth five-year plan (1971-1975) with the sixth fi- 
ve-year plan (1981-1985), i.e. the last period of the Mao era and the most re- 
cently completed plan period of the Deng era. Of course, one has to bear in 
mind that official Chinese statistics can be grossly misleading, but one has to 
work with them and certain images they give can be corrected through other 
approaches, for example, case-studies. A first rough evaluation of these figu- 
res will most probably deliver the first clues to crucial fields, where more in- 
depth surveys are needed. 
Table 1 indicates that in terms of growth rates of the main sectors there was a 
big upswing. The growth rate of light industry increased whereas that of 
heavy industry decreased, but in both cases this was intended by the economic 
planners. One question ensuing from this would be: was it really possible to 
readjust the two branches of industry? 
Table 2 deals with the main so-called economic proportions. A big change can 
be noticed with respect to the division of productive and non-productive ac- 
cumulation, in Western terms, investment. During the fourth plan the pro- 
portion of accumulation allocated to the non-productive sector amounted on- 
ly to 24.5%, during the sixth plan period this proportion was almost one half 
of total accumulation. Did this have implications regarding the service sector? 
Is the service sector really regarded as an equal partner of the traditional pro- 
Table I .  Main Economic Indicators of the 4th and 6th Five-Year Plan Periods 
(Comparison of Growth Rates) 
4th Plan 6th Plan 
Total product of societya 7.3 10.8 
1970: 403.1,1975: 573.8 
1980: 853.7, 1985: 1,426.1 
Gross output value of agriculture and industryn 
1970: 424,3, 1975: 616.2 
1980: 908.6, 1985: 1,525.3 
of which 
- gross agricultural output value 
1970: 166.3, 1975: 202.1 
1980: 259.1, 1985: 444.9 
- gross industrial output value 
1970: 787.1, 1975: 1,218.8 
1980: 1,888.9, 1985: 3,147.9 
' light industry 
1970: 515.6, 1975: 748.4 
1980: 1,259.5, 1985: 2,221.1 
* heavy industry 
1970: 1,290.2, 1975: 2,093.8 
1980: 3,036.4, 1985: 4,808.4 
National Incomea 
1970: 249.7, 1975: 284.7 
1980: 515.9, 1985: 823.0 
a. Calculated with 1952 as base year, equal to 100; the index numbers for 1985 were calcula- 
ted on the basis of the growth rates for 1984/1985. 
Sources: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1985 (Beijing 1985); Xinhua, February 28,1986, as quo- 
ted in Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) ,  FE/8197/C/l-9, March 3,1986. 
ductive sectors? The proportion of agriculture of the combined gross output 
value only slightly increased from 31.1 % to 33.8% in the assessed periods. Is 
agriculture, or more generally the countryside, better off than the urban 
areas? 
The problems mentioned in the last paragraph lead us to Table 3. A first 
glimpse shows us that the average annual per capita wage of staff and workers 
in state-owned units from 1978 until 1985 approximately doubled, while the 
per capita income of peasants almost tripled. There is clear evidence that in- 
come from collective operations decreased, while income from household 
production increased and in 1984 contributed approximately 80% of the total 
income of the peasants. But has the standard of living of the peasants really 
undergone such a quick improvement? 
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Table 2. Proportions of Main Economic Indicators of the 4th and 6th Five- 
Year Plans (in percent) 
4th Plan 6th Plan 
Industrya 
- light industry 
- heavy industry 
Consumptionb 
- personal consumption 
- public consumption 
Accumulationb 
- productive 
- non-productive 
- fixed assets 
- circulating funds 
a. Calculated as the arithmetic mean of the individual years of the whole plan period. b. As 
a., but only for the years 1981-1984. 
Source: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1985 (Beijing 1985). 
Table 3. Development of Income of Peasants and Workers and Staff in State- 
owned Units, 1976-1985 (in Yuan) 
Year (1) (2) (3) ( 3 4  (3b) ( 3 ~ )  
1971 597 
1972 622 
1973 614 
1974 622 
1975 613 
1976 605 
1977 602 
1 978 644 133.57 88.53 35.79 9.25 
1979 705 160.17 101.97 44.00 14.20 
1980 803 191.33 108.37 62.55 20.41 
1981 812 500.4 223.44 116.20 84.52 22.72 
1982 836 535.3 270.11 58.09 187.55 24.47 
1983 865 572.9 309.77 36.06 244.88 28.17 
1984 961 660.1 355.33 35.33 282.85 31.17 
1 985 1.142 752.0 397.00 
(1) Average annual wage of staff and workers in state-owned units. 
Sources: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1981 (Beijing 1982); Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1985 
(Beijing 1985); Renmin Ribao, January 12, 1986; Xinhua, February 28, 1986, quoted in 
SWB, FE/8197/C/9, March 3,1986. 
(2) Yearly income per capita in cities according to a sample survey. 
Sources: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1983 (Beijing 1983); Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1983 
(Beijing 1985); Xinhua, February 28, quoted in SWB, FE/8197/C/8, March 3, 1986. 
(3) Yearly net income per capita of peasant households according to a sample survey. 
Sources: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1983 (Beijing 1983); Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1985 
(Beijing 1985); Xinhua, February 28,1986, quoted in SWB, FE/8197/C/8, March 3, 1986. 
(3a) Of which: income from the collective. 
Sources: as (3). 
(3b) Net income from household production. 
Sources: as (3). 
(3c) Other non-borrowed incomes. 
Sources: as (3). 
Structural Deficiencies and Shortcomings of Mao-type Economy 
China's economic system at the end of the Mao period was overcentralized 
and overplanned. Growth had been achieved through extensive investments. 
Because of inefficiency and waste there was no real increase in living stan- 
dards. Bottlenecks, shortages and serious imbalances were omnipresent. 
Energy shortages frequently idled the productive apparatus. Partially pro- 
cessed goods were in short supply in some places and excess production was 
being warehoused in other places. According to official sources, in mid-1978 
the products stockpiled in storage amounted to 200 billion Yuan equalling half 
the annual industrial output value of the entire economy of the c0untry.l 
Large parts of capital stock were obsolete, and total factor productivity was 
declining. Thus, for example, in the period of 1976-1978 labour productivity 
of full-time workers and employees in the state-owned industrial enterprises 
only increased 1.7% annually as against 8.7% during the first five-year plan 
period (1953-1957) .2 
Production of both agricultural and light industrial goods fell short of the 
needs both in terms of quantity and quality. Underemployment and unem- 
ployment were common features. Educational and research institutions were 
in a shambles, and because of the isolation during the cultural revolution and 
the 'mass strategy' pursued in these fields China had fallen far behind the ad- 
vanced countries. 
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To cite John Unger, until Mao's death the peasantry had been required to 
experiment with agricultural techniques totally unsuited to local conditions. 
The peasants had been committed to labour during the slack seasons for little 
pay on commune and country public work projects of no direct benefit to 
them. The size of the private plots and the privately organized pig and poultry 
raising had repeatedly been reduced. The peasants had been forced to raise 
grain even on fields unsuited to grain ra i~ ing .~  
A centralized system, such as existed during the time of the cultural revol- 
ution, where market relations do not operate, can only function at a low level 
of economic development. In this stage the division of labour, specialization, 
and the smooth exchange of goods are not important. The moment a substan- 
tial increase in productivity becomes the unavoidable prerequisite for indus- 
trial growth, in other words the moment the socio-economic level as a whole 
is to be raised, this concept is no longer appli~able.~ The same applies to the ex- 
ternal economic relations. 
In the following sector-wise comments on the reform the author attempts to 
gain evidence from micro-level or macro-level studies in order to be able to 
isolate developments or facts that might have adverse effects on the reform in 
the long run. If only a macro-level analysis had been used there might have 
emerged a tendency in the findings that could give a wrong impression. 
Agricultural and Rural Problems 
Reform Measures and their Effects 
Evidence suggests that there had been no master plan to reform agriculture, no 
deliberate effort from above to steer all of rural China down a single path.5 
The reform process represents a complex and somewhat erratic interaction 
between top and bottom levels of the bureaucratic structure. This finally led 
to an almost complete abandonment of the commune system, which had 
reached its heyday during the cultural revolution. 
The reform was initiated by Zhao Ziyang and Wan Li in Sichuan and An- 
hui. In 1979 and 1980 some leading organs of the Chinese press claimed that 
only some 10% of the villages which were the most impoverished and back- 
ward would ever adopt the new systems that meant a departure from the col- 
lectivist system of the c o m m ~ n e . ~  By early 1984 newspapers reported that 
more than 90 % of the agricultural production teams had decided to decollec- 
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tivize into the new responsibility system, i.e. into family-operated smallhold- 
ings . 
Unger's survey of twenty-eight villages in several provinces suggests that, 
had the decision been the peasants' to make, many communities might well 
have stopped short of dividing the collective property to such an e~tent .~De- 
collectivization took place county-wise, i.e. new regulations were issued uni- 
formly in one county, whereas other sets of new regulations were released in 
other counties. 
The responsibility system in the countryside, like similar experiments in the 
past, has increased production significantly. This can be demonstrated by 
macro-data such as, for example, that presented in Table 1. One might suggest 
that, as a weak point in the development sequence, regional differentials 
might occur. But statistical analysis shows us that, against conventional be- 
lief, nearly every province, irrespective of its former backward or top posi- 
tion, could experience considerable success, particularly in grain produ~tion.~ 
In terms of grain production during the time between 1979 and 1984 only the 
provinces of Guangxi (3.8 % ), Gansu (8.2 % ), and Hebei (9.8 % ) experienced 
an aggregated growth per capita of less than 10%. Those provinces which 
showed internal achievement differentials until the late 1970s could experi- 
ence growth rates considerably higher than the average rates. This applies 
both to grain production and to total agrarian value creation. 
Especially the provinces of Sichuan and Anhui have to be mentioned be- 
cause they were understood as crisis areas and the agricultural reform was in- 
itiated there. Sichuan with a population of more than 100 million was, with an 
agrarian value creation of 197 Yuan per capita in 1984, below the national av- 
erage of 215 Yuan, but the growth rate for the time period of 1979-1984 
amounted to 72.8%. Furthermore, the province became a top area in grain 
production (1984: 403 kg per capita; national average 394 kg). Similar figures 
can be given for Anhui: agrarian value creation of 220 Yuan per capita in 1984; 
growth rate in grain.production of 36.2 % in 1979-1984, grain production per 
capita in 1984 of 432 kg.lo 
The relatively rapid growth in these former crisis provinces can of course be 
attributed to the efforts of dynamic and energetic provincial leaders. Another 
strand of explanation might be that quick success could be achieved in places 
where the deficiencies and shortcomings of the old system were especially 
grave. Certainly, further detailed studies are necessary to have clear insights 
into these developmehts. 
The decollectivization into millions of family smallholdings meant a chal- 
Table 4. Income of Members and Cadres of Liuhe Production Brigade, 
1979 and 1980 
1979 1980 
1. Members of brigade (number) 1,304 (1,265) 
2. Brigade cadres, peasant-teachers etc. (number) 146 42 
3. Yearly income of cadres in non-productive work  points 
(tongchou gongfen) 53,710 
4. Yearly income of cadres in Yuan 
(line 3 multiplied by 0.8) 42,968 3,264 
5. Average contribution to  income of cadres b y  each 
brigade member in Yuan (line 4 divided by line 1) 32.95 2.58 
6.  Grain deliveries to cadres (total in kg) 92,992 
7. Average contribution to  grain deliveries b y  each 
brigade member (line 6 divided by line 1) 72.00 
Liuhe Production Brigade is located in Tanhe commune, Xinyang county, Henan province. 
Source: New china News Agency (NCNA), August 25, 1981, quoted in SWB, FE/6814/ 
BII, September 29, 1981. 
lenge to some strata of the rural bureaucracy. Before the reform, cadres of 
production brigades and teams had the authority to bring pressure to bear 
against the ordinary brigade or team members. Now the new systems of pro- 
duction responsibility loosened the cadres' permanent supervision. Some con- 
siderable numbers of cadres were released from their posts and transferred to 
normal agricultural work again. The following table shows the effects of re- 
form concerning income in a production brigade in Henan province. 
A break-down of the cadres as to administrative, teaching or medical func- 
tions is not known. It can be assumed that some of these services had certainly 
to be paid privately by the peasants. But the heavy burden of cost paid for 
over-administration was taken off their shoulders. 
It is understandable that the cadres thus released and become powerless -co- 
vertly or openly - are in opposition against the reform. But there is another 
stratum of cadres usually of higher rank which seems to accomodate relative- 
ly smoothly to the new system. Numerous cases have become known of al- 
liances between "new elements", i.e. rich peasants, and cadres.ll The peasants 
contribute 'donations' such as money for schools or other infrastructural insti- 
tutions, whereas the cadres, especially such powerful cadres who continue to 
control the allocation of dozens of sorts of permits and who control access to 
most of the village-owned resources and property, bring in their 'political re- 
lations'. Such relations can be instrumental in providing favours to the rich 
peasantry. Whether or not this 'antagonistic cooperation' becomes a normal 
thing in the villages or counties remains to be seen. 
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Of course, there are strata of the rural population who are not included in 
this new patronage network and therefore are worried about the new systems. 
First, there are families with a large number of dependents, elderly people 
without relatives to care for them, imcomplete families and families with ill or 
disabled members. Under the old collectivist system, these people used to re- 
ceive free grain and a minimum supply within the framework of the "five 
guarantees". The individualistic attitude of a large quantity of the farmers, 
particularily the rich ones, has strengthened their reluctance to cooperate with 
their weaker neighbours. The old safety net has been widely destroyed, and 
new social security systems such as for instance insurance systems will take 
decades to operate effectively. 
Secondly, there are households having no reserves which, for some reason 
or other, are not competitive. Technological inputs are expensive, and it is far 
from clear whether many smallholders can raise the necessary capital. They 
might be driven off their plots and run into debts, if a crop fails. One solution 
for these people and particularly people from disadvantaged hinterland areas 
could be hired labour. The wages or more generally the income might be high- 
er than under the old system. But should a large migration from the disadvan- 
taged areas into the well-to-do areas take place, the wages could be levelled. 
Furthermore problems of exploitation could occur. The authorities in Beijing 
plan to foster so-called central towns in the countryside and to develop them 
into small industrial centres. 
Estimates are available on the employment effects of the new systems. The 
enormous rural population could not continue to improve their living stan- 
dards on the tiny plots. It is openly admitted by certain Chinese planners that 
only 30% to 40% of the peasant households could make their living on the 
existing croplands.12 Xue Muqiao went as far as to say that "once agriculture is 
modernized, it will need only a few dozen million people at the most instead of 
the present 300 million if production remains on the same scale. This means 
more than 200 million people waiting for jobs, which will have to be found in 
new fields of production."13 
The land/man ratio is constantly decreasing, On June 22,1986 the Beijing 
paper Jingjixue Zhoubao carried an article on the drastic decrease of farmland 
in the country.14 According to this source, the farmland per capita fell from 
2.59 mu in 1957 to 1.57 mu in 1977, a decrease of 39%. During the sixth five- 
year plan period (1981-1985) China annually lost 7.377 million mu of farm- 
land on average, an annual rate of decrease of 0.5 %. In Heilongjiang province 
the farmland per capita was 8.4 mu in 1977, the figure now is 4 mu. The re- 
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spective figures for other provinces were as follows: Anhui 1977 3 mu, 1982 
1.6 mu; Guangdong 1977 1.5 mu, now 0.78 mu; Zhejiang 1977 1.5 mu, now 
0.7 mu; Sichuan 1977 2 mu, now less than 1 mu. During 1985 the farmland in 
Shandong decreased by 1.87 million mu, that of Xinjiang by 1.706 million mu 
and that of Guangdong by 1.010 million mu. The farmland in these six pro- 
vinces and one autonomous region decreased by 7.910 million mu in all. 
Among the main reasons for the drastic decrease in farmland are: I. The 
state and townships have occupied a large area of farmland for their construc- 
tion purposes. 11. The speed of the peasants' occupation of land for building 
houses has become very high. 111. Soil erosion has decreased farmland. Chi- 
na's current area of eroded soil is about between 1.1 million and 1.5 million 
km2, accounting for between one-eight and one-sixth of the country's terri- 
tory. One reason for the upsetting of ecological balance is the arbitrary felling 
of forests. IV. Sideline production has occupied more farmland. 
On the one hand, farmland is lost because of erosion and non-agricultural 
use of land mainly by industrial enterprises. In the course of industrialization, 
competition for land will grow between agriculture and industry. On the 
other hand, the law of diminishing returns seems to apply to agriculture. This 
is especially true for the agrarian top areas of China. Though the technical op- 
timum in the increase of land productivity has evidently not yet been reached, 
one seems to have come near the optimal point in economic terms,15 though 
the latter criterion might be subject to the arbitrary fixing of price relations 
and other reference items. 
The disintegration of the old collectivist social security system and the ra- 
tionale of the new responsibility systems ("many hands mean wealth") tend to 
have adverse effects on population control policy in the countryside. 
As a sort of flanking measure the economic decision makers in Beijing de- 
creed considerable purchase price increases for agricultural products. Besides 
supporting the reform, these increases were meant to stop the development of 
the internal terms of trade between industry and agriculture to the disadvan- 
tage to the latter. In terms of the "absolute scissors differential between agri- 
culture and industry" a maximum value to the disadvantage of the peasants 
was reached in 1975.16 Only in 1982 the state prevailing in 1957 had again been 
reached. In other words: from 1957until1975 the peasants had to work longer 
each year for a certain quantity of industrial products; only after 1978 a signi- 
ficant improvement of the price relationship occurred. 
In the course of agricultural reform the prices were increased by 20% for 
quota grain and by 70% for above-quota grain. The state undertook to buy 
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some 50 to 60 million tons of grain at guaranteed prices. This resulted in a huge 
increase in the subsidies which had to be paid to agriculture. The amount of 
subsidies in the state budget increased sharply especially after 1984. This result 
of the reform policy is called "subsidies trap" because thriving agricultural 
production compels the state to pay more and more subsidies so that the re- 
sources for industrial modernization are reduced. 
Repercussions of Agricultural Reform on the Whole National Economy 
The central authorities in Beijing, after the death of Mao Zedong, facing a 
grim economic and social situation, initiated agriyultural reform by means of 
a big decision in the realm of Ordnungspolitik (systemic policy). We have to 
leave the question unanswered whether there was a master plan or just an ex- 
periment in the beginning which was made nationwide afterwards. One aim 
of this decision seemed to be to disengage the state from the day-to-day bur- 
dens of interventionist policies in order to have ample manoeuvring room for 
modernization work in the industrial, urban, sector. Thus the central authori- 
ties tried to leave investments, control and organization tasks to the lower le- 
vel authorities in the countryside. A side aim was to minimize the so-called 
economic transaction costs of the reform for the modern sector of economy 
and society. 
As we know by now, the original scheme did not work fully. The state had 
frequently to intervene. Considering the state of the agriculture, considerable 
growth rates are possible only on the basis of infrastructural work. In the past 
a large proportion of infrastructure projects (irrigation, dams, roads, etc.) had 
been implemented by means of campaigns, i.e. voluntary and low-paid or 
even non-paid mass labour of millions of people. Chinese economists call this 
phenomenon "labour accumulation". Machetzki estimates that in the pre-re- 
form era 20 days per man-year were dedicated to infrastructural projects. Ta- 
king a work force of 250 million people this would mean a total of 5 billion of 
work days per year.17 
Future agricultural development will largely depend upon technological 
improvements, i. e. more mechanized irrigation systems, better supply of arti- 
ficial fertilizer and strains of seed. It is an open question whether or not the 
agricultural system as a subsystem of the economy will be in a position to pro- 
pel the needed growth independently. It is more likely that the state will be, at 
some time in the future, compelled to allocate considerable investments into 
agriculture. For the time being the results of agriculture and the improvement 
of the standard of living of most of the peasants are promising. But these suc- 
Chinese Economics, 1976-1986: Basic Trendsand Perspectives 
cesses may to a large extent stem from the fact that the gravest deficiencies and 
shortcomings of the old system have been removed and that the individualis- 
tic motivation was set free. 
As productive yields reach a plateau level, there will most probably be an 
increase in state intervention in the agricultural sector. Possibly this will be 
connected with more and more control devolving on party and state cadres. A 
consequence could be that then more and more features of the old system will 
re-emerge.18 Recently tentative views on 'centralization' in the rural economy 
have been voiced. "With the development of the rural economy, a disadvan- 
tage of too much decentralization - i.e. that it restricts the development of the 
productive forces - is being gradually exposed".19 The author of the article in 
Guangming Ribao then gives reasons for his opinion: 
First, the development of a commodity economy entails 'centralization' 
. . . As a result of backward technology and backward management, more 
time will have to be spent on producing an individual product than is so- 
cially necessary and losses will be inevitable. In order to overcome the dis- 
advantages of the peasants' decentralized operations, it is necessary to 
establish centralized service organizations which provide effective and ef- 
ficient information, technical and management services for the peasants 
involved in decentralized operations.. . . 
Secondly, because of its special characteristics, agricultural production 
requires centralization. Natural conditions greatly affect agricultural pro- 
duction. In order to enhance the people's ability to cope with nature, it is 
necessary to group and organize the peasant households so that they can 
share water resources, work together to build irrigation works and so on. 
Thirdly, socialized production calls for 'centralization'. The development 
of our commodity economy has led to a higher degree of the division of 
labour and a higher degree of specialization in rural areas. The more 
closely the peasants are tied to society, the more socialized production 
and management will be. In the course of agricultural production, some 
processes, such as the growing, purification and rejuvenation of seeds and 
seedlings and the drying, processing and transport of products must be 
handled by some specialized units which provide centralized services for 
peasant households. 
Fourthly, 'centralization' is essential if we are to take the road of mutual 
prosperity. 
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Investments for the modernization of agriculture have to come from the in- 
dustrial sector of the economy, and thus the crucial issue of any further reform 
and development of the whole system is the functioning and progress of the in- 
dustrial or modern sector of the Chinese economy. 
Problems of the Industrial Sector 
The Reform Document of October 20,1984 
The key docydeqt on reform of the economic structure is the decision of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, adopted by the 12th 
CC of the CPC at its third plenary session on October 20, 1984.20 Though the 
title of the document refers to the 'economic structure', the document almost 
exclusively deals with the industrial sector of the economy, the 'urban econ- 
omy'. In this document one finds sharp criticism of the state of industry being 
mainly the result of the internal disorder during the cultural revolution. The 
economic efficiency of urban enterprises, according to the document, was 
low, and losses and waste in production, construction and commodity distri- 
bution were high. The superiority of socialism had yet to be brought into full 
play. Apart from historical, political and ideological causes, a major econ- 
omic cause for this was a rigid economic structure that could not meet the 
needs of the growing forces of production. 
The Chinese economy should, according to the reform document, continue 
to be a planned economy, but parts of the economy should be regulated 
through market forces. Only the key industries should remain in the realm of 
command planning. The medium-scale industry should be steered by guid- 
ance planning, and the small enterprises, particularly in the service sector, 
should function according to the market forces of supply and demand. The 
' 
law of value will play a prominent role. The socialist economy is "a planned 
economy on the basis of public ownership of the means of production", the 
law of value being "consciously applied. The difference between socialist and 
capitalist economy, as far as a commodity economy and the law of value are 
concerned, lies not - according to the document - in whether they are still 
functioning, but in the difference in ownership, in whether there is an exploit- 
ing class and whether the working people are masters of the state.. . Under so- 
cialist conditions, neither labour power nor land, mines, banks, railways and 
all other state-owned enterprises and resources are commodities. 
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A host of further regulations is decreed. Among them are regulations con- 
cerning the price reform. There is no room here to deal with all these elements 
of reform and the repercussions they had and will have. Suffice it here to make 
a brief remark on price reform. Prices should reflect the values of commodities 
as determined by the supply and demand situation. It is extremely difficult to 
carry through a price reform in a sellers'market. Inevitably distortions will oc- 
cur in such a situation, and the state is again and again compelled to interfere, 
for example, lest inflation should exert a disruptive influence and create social 
unrest. But the PRC cannot wait for a buyers' market to appear. The reform of 
the urban economy is envisaged to be instrumental in creating a buyers' mar- 
ket - certainly a dilemma. 
The most important parts of the reform design are, first, the separation of 
government from enterprise functions and, secondly, regulations relating to 
the internal reform of the enterprises, various forms of economic responsibili- 
ty systems and the principle of distribution according to work. The main role 
of the state is to establish the framework for the operations of the enterprises, 
namely opening up of resources, coordination, planning of key projects, sup- 
ply of raw materials, establishment of long-term perspective plans, erection of 
infrastructural projects, etc. Furthermore, the enterprises as independent 
units 
are to compete with each other in order to raise productivity and to make bet- 
ter use of scarce means. 
Already in 1983 and in the first half of 1984, the enterprises had been given 
greater decision-making rights. The transfer of profits had been replaced by a 
tax system, the enterprises could produce above-quota products, fix the prices 
for these commodities and do the marketing on their own accounts, etc. These 
regulations were supplemented by the introduction of the economic responsi- 
bility system. Contracts are concluded between employees and enterprises 
wherein rights and duties of both parties are fixed. The bonus and premium 
system is coupled with production achievements, the wage system in general 
is being reformed. 
A crucial issue of the reform is the leading personnel. Factory directors shall 
take the responsibility for most of the economic operations of the enterprises, 
of course supported by party leaders and the workers' congresses. The further 
success of the reform will predominantly depend on directors, managers or 
entrepreneurs of a Chinese type - whatever one chooses to call them. There- 
fore one has to take a closer look at this important stratum of the industrial so- 
ciety. 
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Excursion: Experiences of a 'German-Chinese' Factory Director 
On October 1, 1984, the German engineer Werner Gerich from Bretten was 
appointed general manager of the Wuhan diesel engine factory. The retired 
engineer, 66 years old, came to China under a programme of the German Sen- 
ior Expert Service, an organization which sends, upon demand, retired ex- 
perts into developing countries - with only a nominal salary. With the help of 
a so-called 'guidance group' Gerich carried out a thorough management re- 
form which was extended to the workshops. Several leading cadres were 
sacked, work discipline and overall efficiency were considerably raised. Table 
5 presents, in the second section, a survey of the results. 
At first some of the staff voiced their annoyance at him, reproached him with 
his "German discipline" and accused him of wanting "to become the chief of 
the chiefsff .21 But later on he was made honorary citizen of Wuhan, received by 
Zhao Ziyang, Yao Yilin etc. Now the Chinese media call him respectfully 'Mr. 
Quality' and describe him as a 'model factory directorf. 
Under Gerich the Wuhan diesel engine factory did not import sophisticated 
means of production or equipment. The success was mainly achieved by 
strictly observing given rules and specifications, greater changes were only 
made in management organization and control. For example, Gerich kound 
out that as a result of starting machines late and shutting them down early, 
each person wasted at least 70 minutes each day. Thus, the factory lost over 
2,400 man-hours every day, which meant over 700,000 hours lost each year.22 
This very case shows us that there is probably a large scope for rationalization 
in most of the Chinese enterprises. The egalitarian policy of the Mao era had 
led to slackness and indifference. 
Is a Chinese Entrepreneur in the Ofling? 
Certainly a rejuvenation of the cadres has taken place in the reform era. To cite 
Doak Barnett, more than one million senior cadres recruited before 1949 have 
been retired, and 44% of the leading officials at the provincial level and close 
to half at the prefectural level has been replaced.23 But what about those cadres 
in the position of factory directors? 
The Shanghai newspaper Wen Hui Bao carried a report on the first issue of 
Zhongguo Qiyejia (China's Entrepreneurs), in which the honorary chairman 
of the China Plant Directors' Work Research Society dealt with the character- 
istics Chinese entrepreneurs should possess.24 First - he wrote - they should 
possess long-range ideals and ambitions. Secondly, they should simultaneou- 
sly grasp the building of material and spiritual civilization. Thirdly, they 
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Table 5. Wuhan Diesel Engine Factory: Structural Data 
and Performance Rates 
Structural Data 
Established in 
Number of workers and staff 
Equipment (586 pieces valued individually at 
over 800 Yuan) of which: 
- purchased in the 1960s 
- purchased in the 1970s 
- purchased in the early 1980s 
Performance Rates 
Production volume 
Above-quota profits 
Casting rejects 
Up-to-standard rates for 
- first time test runs 
- performance of components 
- key components 
Degree of cleanliness (ministry standard: 165 mg) 
Consumption per horse power of 
- oil (ministry standard 1.7 g) 
- diesel (ministry standard 185 g) 
Reworking rates (percentage changes as 
compared with Jan. -Nov. 1984) 
- block 
- crankshaft 
- cylinder head 
- engine 
Jan. -Nov. 
1984 
100.00% 
100.00% 
32.72% 
Sources: Fang Bi, "Zhuajin qiye neiwai de peitao gaige, shi gaohuo qiye de biyouzhilu" 
(Grasping firmly coordinated reforms both within and outside an enterprise is the only way 
to stimulate the enterprise), Jingji Guanli, No. 3 (1986), pp. 20-22; Qin Zhong, "Ge Lixi shi 
zenyang zhili 'Wuchai' de?" (How did Gerich put the Wuhan diesel engine factory in or- 
der?), Jingji Guanli, ibid., pp. 23-26. 
should correctly handle relationships between the state, collective and indivi- 
duals. Fourthly, they should correctly handle relationships between plant di- 
rectors, party committees and workers' congresses. Fifthly, they should strive 
to acquire modern management knowledge. 
According to this catalogue modern management knowledge seems to play 
a minor role. Much emphasis has been given to the correct handling of the re- 
lationships between the different levels. In the backbone enterprises, the large 
state-owned ones, the factory directors are mainly to represent the state." In 
ErhardLouven 
the ordinary large and medium-sized enterprises, the factory directors are ba- 
sically to represent the enterprises, and in the small enterprises that produce 
manufactured goods for daily use the factory directors are entirely to repre- 
sent the enterprises. This hierarchy hints at the fact that the state will not give 
way to an independent stratum of entrepreneurs that could form a certain 
power basis. 
Opposition against successful or enthusiastic managers comes from all 
levels. Numerous examples have recently been cited by the Chinese press. 
Thus a state-owned pland in Xi'an which carried out a series of reform measu- 
res was harassed by "a work team sent by the departments in charger', which 
distracted people from their work in the factory and caused output to 
On June 16,1986, the People's Daily reported several cases in which innovati- 
ve managers had been attacked.27 In almost all of these cases the managers, of- 
ten under the pretext of minor mistakes, had been questioned by higher admi- 
nistrative authorities, whereas the workers backed them. 
While the government in Beijing has pushed hard for application of there- 
ponsibility system for factory directors, local party officials put up resistance 
against the new trend.28 Economic problems are indissolubly connected with 
political problems. It remains to be seen whether or not a stratum of really 
powerful managers can be formed. A new balance between political decision- 
makers and economic leaders, between the traditional ideology-minded lea- 
ders and the pragmatic technocrats has to be found, and it is hoped that the de- 
velopment will not stop short to the disadvantage of the economic men. 
Summary 
This paper started with statistical evidence of the economic success of the re- 
form era as compared with the time before 1976. The reform began in agricul- 
ture and had a tremendous success. A thesis advanced in that part of the paper 
was that the top decision-making elite released the agricultural sector to con- 
centrate on the modern industrial sector. A large part of the agricultural suc- 
cess can probably be attributed to the effects brought about by the repair of 
shortcomings and deficiencies of the old system. Sooner or later agricultural 
yields will reach a plateau level, further improvement then can only be reac- 
hed by increased productivity. Agricultural productivity can only be raised 
by massive investments coming from the industrial sector. The reform of the 
urban economy is an absolute necessity too. 
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In the industrial sector, things are much more complex than in the country- 
side. The state has permanently to intervene even in the realm of economic 
process policy. Crucial issues such as the planning system, the price and wages 
reform, new developments in the finance sector, in the legal system, etc. could 
not be dealt with. The stratum of managers or entrepreneurs of a Chinese type 
is probably to play a leading role in the course of reform. But there is opposi- 
tion against them from traditional power elites in the party or in the middle 
echelons of the economic planning system. 
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